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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.PETE CASTILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
11447

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RTATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Pete Castillo, appeals from a judgment of conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and
from the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was chaged by information with the crime
of assault with a deadly weapon and was tried by a jury
which returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant's motion
for a new trial was denied and appellant was sentenced
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term providPd by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction, or in the alterantive, reversal of the order denying
the motion for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 7 o'clock on the morning of March 12, 1968, ap1wllant went to the home of his former wife to speak with
her personally regarding his anticipated departure from
the state. Upon his arrival, he was met at the door h:-· l1i~
ex-wife's brother, Santana Gonzales (RII. 5). Gonzal('"
first refused to allo-w appellant to talk with Mrs. Castillo,
but then vrns persuaded to stPp into a hallway while H]Jpellant talked with her (RI. 7). After about five rninnfr~.
Gonzales returned (RI. 8). There is conflict in thP frstimony as to the €'vents ·which subsequently transpired. Mr~.
Castillo testified that appellant stood up, pulled a knifr
out of his pocket, and attacked Gonzales, wheren1ion ~111'
interwned, grahhPd for the knife and was stabbed (Hl.
9-10). Appellant, howeyer, testified that Gonzales rdnl'lled with a stick and hit appellant in the head several tirnes;
appellant then pushPd Gonzales away, when•npon <lollzales attackf'd app<'llant with a knife. Appt>llant sulHlt;(•d
Gonzales and lPft the ho11se (RI.14-15). Appellant tl'srified that h<• did not rm1emh<'r th0 detaib of the

:,;tn 1 1·:~.>;l1•

or tlw manner in \\'hich Mrs. Castillo was injured (Rl.
Ap1wllant's

t(•stimon~-

l~J).

l'<'!;·ardi11µ: the lJPating- which Cm:-
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zalcs inflicted upon him was corroborated by Officer
Clark's testimony that when he saw appellant a short
time after the incident, appellant had wounds on his
hands, leg and head (RI. 60). In addition, there was substantial testimony that appellant and Gonzales had displayed mutual hostility prior to March 12, 1968, stemming
from Gonzales' interference with appellant's family affairs (RI 17, 34). Hffwever, despite this testimony
strongly indicating an attack by Gonzales upon appellant,
the trial court refused appllant's requested instructions
relating to his theory of the case that he was acting in selfdefense when Mrs. Castillo was injured. Appellant's
timely exceptions to the refusal of these instructions were
properly entered in the record (RII. 31).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO APPELLANT'S
THEORY OF THE CASE.

It is appellant's theory in the case at bar that at the
time Mrs. Castillo was stabbed, appellant was def ending
himself against an attack by Gonzales, so that the stabbing of Mrs. Castillo, who intervened in an attempt to stop
the altercation, ·was purely an accident. Thus, there was
neypr the requisite intent on the part of appellant to do
hodily harm to Mrs. Castillo. There was substantial evirl<'nce in support of this theory, yet the trial court re-

4
fused to instruct the jury accordingly. It is submitted
that this constituted prejudicial error.
A case directly in point is State v. Harris, 58 Utah
331, 199 Pac. 145 (1921). There, the defendant had been
convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, the def endant himself testified that thedecedent had drawn a gun
immediately before defendant shot and killed the decedent. Despite the testimony, the trial court refused to instruct the jury as to self-defense. On appeal, the judgment
of conviction was reversed on the ground that under
the evidence, defendant was entitled to full and fair instructions on the subject of self-defense. Similarly, in
State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929), invol\·ing
a conviction of burglary, it was held that the trial court's
failure fully to instruct the jury as to defendant's tlwory
of the case constituted prejudicial error requiring n·venml and the grant of a new trial.
In tlw case at har, appellant by his own testimony
offered proof that he ·was acting in self-defense at tlw tillH'
Mrs. Castillo was stabbed. While it is clear that f'Vf'll
amwllant's testimony standing alone would be suff;cient
to require that the trial court instruct the jury regarding'
self-de>fense, State

1;.

Harris, supra, the> re was addi tio11al

by Officer Clark which indicated that appel!m1t
had indeed sustained a ~wve>re lwating. Clearly, th;~,

testimon~-

testimony corrol10ratPd aprwllant's version of the> in('i<1Pnt. 'l'aln. n tog-ether, tlit>

i('stirnon~Y of appellant

aml <il'
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Officer Clark constituted a snshtantial quantum of prohative evidence on the theory of self-defense. Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed fully and fairly,
in concrete rather than ahstract terms, State v. Dewey,
41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912), regarding this theory.
The trial court's refusal so to instruct the jury was manifest error.
CONCLUSION
There was adduced at appellant's trial substantial
(:yidPnce that appellant was acting in self-defense at the
time Mrs. Castillo was injured. This evidence entitled appellant to jury instructions fully explaining the applicable law of self-defense. Despite that such instructions
were requested, the trial court refused so to instruct the
jury. The refusal clearly was prejudicial error, and the
judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAY V. BARNEY
231 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

